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In 1991, a well-meaning consensus group of thought leaders derived a simple definition for sepsis which required
the breach of only a few static thresholds. More than 20 years later, this simple definition has calcified to become
the gold standard for sepsis protocols and research. Yet sepsis clearly comprises a complex, dynamic, and relational
distortion of human life. Given the profound scope of the loss of life worldwide, there is a need to disengage from
the simple concepts of the past. There is an acute need to develop 21st century approaches which engage sepsis
in its true form, as a complex, dynamic, and relational pattern of death.Those attending patient safety conferences this year are
likely to hear that the incidence of unnecessary deaths
due to medical errors in the US is equivalent to a jumbo
jet airline crash occurring every day, and that the major-
ity of these errors are caused by diagnostic delay. This
airline analogy dates back 19 years to 1994 [1], providing
us with another startling analogy. Since 1994 the num-
ber of lives lost in the US due to medical error is equiva-
lent to the total loss of soldiers and civilians on both
sides during World War I. In that horrific conflict the
thought leaders (Generals) continued to send their cour-
ageous soldiers over the top without acknowledging that
their tactics were outdated. Now, nearly a century later
history repeats itself as medical “thought leaders” today
attempt to rally demoralized health care workers in pa-
tient safety conferences, only to send them back into the
trenches armed with an antiquated, simplistically incap-
able “diagnostic science” from the past century.
Certainly, bedside sepsis diagnostics has made little
progress since the late 1980s. In some respects, arguably
the diagnostic definition of sepsis has actually declined.
This isn’t surprising since much of the unnecessary loss
of life from sepsis highlighted over the past decade has
been due to its delayed detection. To understand why
this is happening, we have only to review the recent his-
tory of sepsis diagnostics.Correspondence: llynn@lyntekmedical.com
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stated.In the 1970s and early 80s there was a rapid growth in
the understanding of the complex patho-physiologic ele-
ments comprising sepsis. In those days physicians consid-
ered sepsis to be a complex dynamic relational pattern of
symptoms and laboratory findings, and concluded that
sepsis was present when the patient exhibited a combin-
ation of symptoms and laboratory findings consistent with
sepsis. This was our traditional “expert” method of med-
ical diagnostics. The problem with this method is that it
was complex and difficult to both reproduce and quantify.
Then with the 1980s, there came a strong push to develop
solid “scientific” methods of medical diagnostics, which
would be simple enough to easily learn, copy accurately,
and disseminate. The most popular of these emerging
methods at that time was based on a new theory of med-
ical diagnostics called “threshold decision making” [2].
Thresholds are now so much a part of 21st century med-
ical diagnostics that it might surprise those who trained
in the past 20 years to learn that formalized threshold
decision making is quite new. The threshold theory driv-
ing this approach is a reductionist (simplification based)
theory that conceptualizes human disease as being best
defined by one or more thresholds often derived from la-
boratory or vital sign testing. Threshold decision making
holds that the clinician can either mathematically or men-
tally combine pretest probabilities of conditions with the
sensitivity and specificity of one or more breached thresh-
olds to determine the overall probability of an acute dis-
ease at the bedside.
Regarding sepsis, a typical question an adroit research
clinician might ask while applying threshold decisionis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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specificity for sepsis when using an elevated biomarker
threshold value in an adult patient presenting to the ER
with symptoms suggesting an infection?” The same clin-
ician might further ask whether this sensitivity and spe-
cificity is better than that from a WBC count in the same
patient population. He or she might then prospectively
sample venous blood in a very large population of ran-
domized patients and apply a standard sepsis definition to
determine which patients had sepsis and which did not.
The next step would be to compare different threshold
levels of biomarker in those patients meeting the defin-
ition of sepsis and in those patients who did not in order
to identify the cutoff value for the biomarker with the best
sensitivity and specificity for sepsis. The sensitivity and
specificity of this biomarker’s threshold value could then
be compared with optimal threshold values for WBC
counts to determine which test is more reliable.
This may at first blush appear to be logical and scien-
tifically sound, but a dose of skepticism is called for. One
reason for doubting this methodology is that threshold de-
cision making, when applied to sepsis diagnostics, hasn’t
worked very well. Hearing the same jumbo jet airliner
crash analogy repeated for 19 years straight should be an
obvious clue, and certainly if any science based on a new
theory is applied for 2 decades with persistently poor per-
formances to show for it, the fundamental theory should
be reconsidered.
Why is threshold decision making theory unsound re-
garding sepsis? One problem is that it requires the sep-
aration of a population into two distinct groups. Clinical
“theorists” must first have an accurate, reliable definition
for the disease, in this case sepsis, and then group the
population into a “disease group” and “no disease group”.
Unfortunately, in the 1980s there was no reliable defin-
ition of sepsis to allow for this appropriate separation. But
this did not matter because threshold decision making
requires research clinicians to make this reductionist
move regardless, even when a true definition of disease
does not exist. Later, as we will show, research clinicians
did decide to keep form by using their best consensus
guess at defining sepsis first, which then would serve to
separate the groups as described above. However, in the
early 1980s it was up to each research group to choose
their own definition.
Obviously, whenever a range of “best guess” definitions
of disease are used in clinical research to separate popu-
lations, the results of that research become subjective
and unreliable. One minor error in the guessed defin-
ition can render inaccurate results. Furthermore, since
each individual research group was allowed to guess
their own definition of sepsis for each of their own clin-
ical trials, then it’s reasonable to expect each guess to be
a little different. By the late 1980s the thought leaders ofthis diagnostic science realized they had a major prob-
lem on their hands. Researchers were applying threshold
theory to multiple clinical trials on sepsis, yet each trial
used different definitions for sepsis, likening any study
comparisons to the proverbial apples to oranges. Both
the validity of this research and its applicability to the
bedside management of septic patients were never clear.
The leaders had to find a solution, and because the
problem of excessive deaths due to sepsis was particu-
larly acute, the solution had to be found quickly.
One available option would have been to perform a
multicenter clinical trial in patients with severe infection
with bacteremia resulting in death or near death, and
then select the sepsis definition as a function of the find-
ings from this trial. However, mathematical reductionism
had become increasing popular in 1980s medical diag-
nostics, and most scientists had not yet perceived the
weaknesses of reductionist threshold theory and the dan-
gerous anomalies it commonly induces. About this same
time a new validation methodology called “consensus the-
ory” began to emerge. This theory held that reliable, valid
scientific judgment could be rendered through a formal
process of expert consensus derived from a heterogeneous
population of experts. This was popularized by the Delphi
method of decision making. Consensus theory offered the
quickest solution for the need of a “legitimate” sepsis def-
inition, and thought leaders jumped at the opportunity to
take this new approach. This application of consensus the-
ory would be touted to allow for transparency and
standardization across all clinical care regarding sepsis, as
well as all related clinical trials that involved this disease.
Unfortunately, history has shown us that these conclu-
sions were erroneous, as was the expert consensus defin-
ition derived for sepsis itself. Alas, the weakness of expert
consensus, pointed out so graphically by Thomas Kuhn in
the 1960s, had been largely forgotten in the heady days of
late 20th century medical discovery. In fairness, formal
threshold decision making was only a little over 10 years
old at the time, and its weaknesses were not yet well
understood. Indeed, the merging of the threshold theory
with consensus theory seemed quite reasonable during
those years. The well-meant choice to use a hybridization
of two new theories of decision processing was the unfor-
tunate beginning that led to the present state of sepsis
diagnostics, which I discuss below.
With the advantage of hind sight and robust analytics,
we can readily look back and identify the mistakes made
by the original sepsis consensus group in 1991 [3], which
then repeated in 2001 [4], once again repeating in 2012
[5]. The most evident mistake made by this group was
to define sepsis in terms of a few simple static thresh-
olds. Sepsis is known today to be a very complex, dy-
namic and relational distortion of human life. It cannot
be reasonably, accurately, or reliably defined with a few
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tored into the definition. Perhaps the original thought
leaders suspected this all along and were simply trying
to start the process of developing a robust definition in
1991. However, for reasons not entirely clear, this ori-
ginal definition calcified, becoming firmly ensconced as
our gold standard [5], despite its mediocre performance
in terms of mortality and morbidity.
Let us take a deeper look at how simple expert guess-
ing can evolve over 20 years to become a gold standard.
Scientists, despite their reputation for being independent
thinkers, have always been prone to follow those they
perceive as legitimate “thought leaders.” Scientific con-
sensus directives that are repetitively delivered from central
authority exhibit a “Fabian” quality. While actual scientific
discoveries gain validity through repetitive experimental
confirmation, consensus based “discoveries” gain their
“validity” by proclamation and repetition. To this point, in
2001 our thought leaders wishfully argued that the defin-
ition of sepsis, which they had been forced to guess as a
function of the perceived need for consensus in 1991, was
“robust” because it had been “used” (in contrast to tested
or proven) in clinical trials.
Certainly in the early 1990s, the newly published sepsis
thresholds were recognized for what they actually were,
consensus derived guesses. However, over time these
guesses grew in stature, gaining prominence as they were
increasing cited in formal consensus statements and used
as gold standards in clinical trials. Today, our thought
leaders no longer see the need to argue for their “validity”
as components of the definition of sepsis, but simply as-
sume this validity, and quote the old sepsis definition in
new consensus guidelines [5], as one might quote a phys-
ics formula for torque.
With this understanding of today’s definition of sepsis,
let us look a little deeper into its actual components.
The first thing to notice is that the definition is actually
a simple summation of a plurality of static thresholds
where just two threshold breaches (along with the per-
ceived state of infection) are all that is required to complete
the criteria for a positive diagnosis. In today’s vernacular
(and in the software database tools being offered to physi-
cians today), sepsis has become a “three click” diagnosis.
In an example of just how simple the diagnosis of sepsis is
within the standard definition, a fever of 100.7 and a heart
rate of 95 will render a diagnosis of “sepsis”. Most of us
met this simple definition the last time we had a mild case
of self-limiting influenza.
Additional evidence of oversimplification is provided by
the lack of temporal relationships of the threshold values in
the sepsis definition. One needs no mathematical training
to understand that a time critical process like sepsis should
include at least one aspect of time. Regrettably the concept
that this complex patho-physiologic, time-sensitive processcan be quantified by a simple occurrence of two static
threshold values continues to remain the standard for sepsis
protocols and research.
As another example of problems arising from the use
of static thresholds in defining sepsis, it is actually pos-
sible today for a patient to initially meet the standard
definition of sepsis, and then even as this sepsis pro-
gresses to a more severe state over time, to no longer
“have it” according to the threshold criteria. The WBC
count often rises to high levels and then falls as neutro-
phils are expended while sepsis progresses. As a WBC
count falls from its initial peak, it actually may cross
back into its “normal” range. Blood samples taken at that
specific point in time will exhibit a completely normal
WBC count so that, should the patient’s sepsis diagnosis
have been initially defined using the WBC count as one
of the two threshold components needed, the sepsis def-
inition is now no longer met. Obviously this particular
patient hasn’t been miraculously cured, and will more
than likely continue to be aggressively managed, but this
does not necessarily bode well for those patients being
initially tested in this more advanced time-sensitive septic
conundrum. The consensus group actually recognized this
problem, but rather than challenging the validity of its
static threshold driven definition, attempted to solve the
problem by adding yet another static threshold of 10% im-
mature neutrophils.
One important cause for consensus science related error
can be associated with the homogeneity of its thought
leaders’ training. For any consensus method to be effect-
ive, a sufficient number of the scientists involved should
have different training backgrounds. Otherwise, the con-
sensus tends to simply reflect the training and bias of their
common backgrounds. Another interesting bias issue that
is pertinent here because of the heavy reliance on numeric
thresholds, comes from the possibility that expert groups
may subconsciously skew these threshold values toward
certain numbers because of social pressures from other
scientific disciplines. As noted earlier, this appears to have
occurred in the selection of a threshold value for imma-
ture WBC counts, where our experts selected a cutoff
value of 10. This same group also selected the threshold
cutoff of 100 for the number of platelets, and the cutoff of
100-10 for the threshold of heart rate and the same 100-
10 for the threshold of systolic blood pressure. This affin-
ity for the numbers 10 and 100 (which have no inherent
patho-physiologic significance) may have, in part, been
driven by their stated desire to “keep the definition sim-
ple”, as well as the “go metric” initiatives of the late 20th
century when most of these leaders were likely influenced
during their high school and undergraduate training.
It should be clear now that our current standard defin-
ition for sepsis is both incomplete and flawed. For this
reason, clinical trials that rely on this standard sepsis
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far reaching problem may be that the clinicians using
these simple static definitions for the last 20 years have
no other way to think of this dynamic condition except
in terms of flawed static thresholds that often condemn
patients to misdiagnosis and diagnostic delay. One might
perceive it mitigating that the 20th century experts se-
lected thresholds that were very sensitive, but we now
know that this well-meaning approach to the selection of
an “oversensitive” (nonspecific) definition for a potentially
fatal disease results in alarm fatigue and diagnostic delay
due to the “crying wolf” phenomena from excessive false
positive warnings [6,7]. Young physicians, having trusted
in the “scientific” basis of these simple decision making
methods, are now inclined to anchor on only those
thresholds that can be rendered intentionally more spe-
cific (fewer false positives) by increasing their threshold
cutoff values. This does reduce the risk for alarm fatigue,
but unfortunately these rendered threshold breaches
occur only later in the septic process, once again inher-
ently creating diagnostic delay [8].
One residual argument for the use of the simple sepsis
definition is that it is easy to learn. It allows complex cases
of sepsis to be detected by focusing on simple criteria,
which most any healthcare worker can reliably remember.
This argument was made by the sepsis definition consen-
sus group in 1991 and again in 2001 [3,4]. Its rationale was
consistent with another prevailing influence of late 20th
century, the “law” of parsimony (Occam’s razor) which was
often misinterpreted as indicating that a smaller number
of variables is preferable to more. The perceived value of
parsimony was enhanced by the application of multiple
linear regressions, neural nets, genetic algorithms, swarm
intelligence and other analytic methods of the 20th cen-
tury. The high hopes many scientists had in the late 20th
century that these artificial intelligence methods would be
able to provide bedside diagnoses for individual patients
was mitigated by the recognition that these statistical
methods were vulnerable to greater error in the presence
of greater numbers of variables. Unfortunately, the re-
sponse went too far and, by using just a two simple thresh-
old values, they rendered a definition of sepsis which was
nonspecific, and prone to unacceptably high numbers of
false positives [6]. This is an expected collateral effect
whenever excessive emphasis on parsimony prevails. The
proper application of parsimony in science was perhaps
best characterized by Albert Einstein when he said,
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but
not one bit simpler”.
Another more pragmatic argument for the present
consensus definition is that without a unified definition
to fall back on, the basis for diagnosis is not measurable,
and therefore cannot comprise a basis for evidence-based
medicine, which requires the outcome effect be relatableto a measurable decision to treat. This widely dissemi-
nated, well-meant argument is no longer intellectually
tenable. There is no good reason why the definition of
sepsis needs to be what it is today. There is no good rea-
son why the definition of sepsis cannot include the fac-
tor of time or why it needs to be comprised of arbitrary
thresholds that are simply the best 20 year old guesses of
experts from another era, and not the findings from ro-
bust clinical trials.
Given that the present definition of sepsis is simply a
20 year old guess, what might the actual definition of
sepsis be? Is it possible to accommodate the dynamic re-
lational complexity of this disorder and still have a diag-
nostic definition for sepsis that is simple enough to use
at the bedside? To answer this question, it is reasonable
to look at other disciplines that have escaped their own
simplistic constructs. In the early 1900s, the construct of
the universe was static and much simpler than it really
was. Like the sepsis scientists of today, Edwin Hubble
was certainly influenced by his mentors’ dogma, but as
an excellent scientist and student of the history of science,
he was always ready to accept, with proof, that these
standard concepts were incomplete and possibly wrong.
When Dr. Hubble gazed out into the static universe of his
mentors he opened his mind as well as his eyes, perceiving
a dynamic, expanding universe, comprised of billions of
distant dynamic galaxies rather than individual distant
stars and nebulae. Each of these galaxies and their rota-
tional masses contained a central black hole comprising
dynamic distortions in space and time that were never
previously part of its fundamental construct. Even now,
building on these discoveries and new tools to see into the
complexity of space, the constructs of the universe are
radically different from those existing only 30 years ago.
Our present knowledge of the universe was only possible
because a new group of scientists were ready to accept
that even the best contemporary science and its most in-
telligent thought leaders can eventually find themselves
on the wrong path. In fact this has proven inevitable. It is
the one constant remaining in man’s noble quest for sci-
entifically proven knowledge.
Sepsis considered without the constraints of past dogma,
might be seen, not as defined by a plurality of macro-
thresholds, but rather as a dynamic relational distortion of
the fabric of the time matrix of biologic particle densities.
In health, biologic particle densities (e.g. neutrophil count,
platelet count, the concentration of ions, the partial pres-
sures of gasses, and molecules such as albumin) are main-
tained within tight rational variances comprising a stable
time matrix. Upon the development of infection, this time
matrix of biologic particle densities becomes distorted. The
initial distortion and the progression of the infection further
pulls on, and distorts other parts of the matrix over time
generating a complex, cascading, dynamic relational pattern
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checked. In the future, definitions of sepsis may be comprised
of time sensitive motion images of these distortions [8].
However, the purpose of this letter is not to define an
improved diagnostic definition for sepsis. Rather, I hope
to encourage young clinicians, researchers, and scientists
to arouse to the acute need for better methods and
models to define our currently incompetent diagnostic
definition. Together, we must accept that we have clung
to present definition of sepsis, which has been repetitively
proclaimed in 1992, 2002, and finally in the 2012 consen-
sus conference statements, only as a function of its age
and the pedigree and respect we hold for its advocates.
Regrettably, like the emperor that has no clothes, this
standard sepsis definition has be seen for what it really is,
simply a 20 year old embellished, but heavily flawed guess.
Research performed with this definition will consistently
render variable and unreliable results. Worse, the results
of clinical trials using this simple definition have the po-
tential to inflate the diagnosis of sepsis and thereby gener-
ate an inflated (false) sense of improved outcomes due to
its intrinsic diagnostic flaws. For example, by including pa-
tients with mild infection in the diagnosis of sepsis, the
number of survivors will increase and this may be readily
(but incorrectly) attributed to the intervention applied in
the protocol which used this definition.
However, many young scientists trained under the pa-
ternal, central control of consensus science (which di-
rects government grants and influences publications),
may be more inclined to simply call for another consensus
meeting of current “thought leaders” to select “better”
thresholds [7], rather than challenge the fundamental
flaws of the current methodology. This has been the re-
petitive pattern identified by Dr. Thomas Kuhn from his
thought provoking study of centuries of past scientific rev-
olutions. As Dr. Kuhn has pointed out “…science students
accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, not
because of evidence" [9].
As clinicians, when a young patient is not improving
after we have applied all the treatment indicated based
on our assessment, we are taught to start the diagnostic
process over, at the very beginning, as if everything we
initially concluded was incorrect. It is time for our sepsis
thought leaders to set aside bias and apply this same de-
gree of diligence. Unfortunately, Dr. Kuhn teaches that
regardless of the anomalies induce by their consensus,
the thought leaders will not be able to abandon their
dogma. “Though they may begin to lose faith and then
to consider alternatives, they do not renounce the para-
digm that has led them into crisis” [9]. Therefore, it falls
to today’s young clinicians, researchers, and scientists to
take the lead ASAP in the field of sepsis diagnostic sci-
ence to stop these “silent” daily jumbo jet airline crashes.
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